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Validity as a Function of Meaning  
in Somló’s Juristische Grundlehre
Trevor Wedman*
Abstract. Hans Kelsen, along with most other legal theorists, presupposes the existence of the sovereign in 
developing his theory of law. As a result, the Kelsenian theory can only account for legal norms issued in the 
abstract. For legal norms in the abstract though, there is no bearing on which to develop a theory of norms that 
reaches beyond the skeletal. This is an issue which has plagued legal theory for the past century and which this 
paper proposes to address upon a re-reading of the Juristische Grundlehre. Specifically, we are able to open our 
concept of sovereignty with Somló in ways that the Kelsenian theory does not permit. In this paper, I will argue 
that Felix Somló’s flexible conception of sovereignty leads to a much fuller contextualization of legal norms as 
expressions of meaning. 
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In determining how the jus non scriptum can come to be, it is necessary to first clarify the 
genus of which this kind of law forms only one of its species, i.e. one must first ask about 
the essence of the law itself.1
1. FRAMING THE ISSUE
Kelsen asserts that: (i) the Kantian categorical imperative is an ‘empty formula’; (ii) any 
attempt to objectify an ought results in subjecting to logic a category which is illogical; 
(iii) the only object of rational thought in the social realm are interests and conflicts of 
interest which can only be solved through ordering the interests one against the other; and 
(iv) if there would already exist societal order on the basis of reason, then it would be 
foolish to develop a theory of legal positivism.2
*  Doctoral student, Leipzig University, trevor.wedman@gmail.com 
1 Somló (1927) § 100, FN. 1, citing Bruno Schmidt (translated freely by author): ‘Wenn man 
feststellen will, worin das Wesen des jus non scriptum besteht, wird man sich vor allem über das 
genus, von welchem es die eine species darstellen soll, d. h. darüber klar sein müssen, was Recht 
überhaupt ist.’
2 Kelsen (1934) 14, 15: (i) ‘Alle derartigen Versuche haben bisher immer nur zu völlig leeren 
Formeln geführt, wie: ‚Tue das Gute und meide das Böse’, ‚Jedem das Seine’, ‚Halte die richtige 
Mitte’, u. dgl. Auch der ‚kategorische Imperativ ist ganz inhaltslos.’; (ii) ‘Die Gerechtigkeit, ein Ideal 
des Wollens und Handelns, muss sich, zum Gegenstand der Erkenntnis gemacht, unversehens in die 
Idee der Wahrheit verwandeln, die ihren – negativen – Ausdruck im Identitätssatz findet. Diese 
Denaturierung des Problems ist die unvermeidliche Folge der Logifizierung eines von vornherein 
logosfremden Objekts.’; (iii) ‘Vom Standpunkt rationaler Erkenntnis aus gesehen, gibt es nur 
Interessen und damit Interessenkonflikte, deren Lösung durch eine Interessenordnung erfolgt, die 
entweder das eine Interesse gegen das andere, auf Kosten des anderen befriedigt oder aber einen 
Ausgleich, ein Kompromiß zwischen den gegensätzlichen Interessen stiftet.’; (iv) ‘Angesichts eines 
Vorhandenseins einer absolut guten, sich schon aus der Natur, der Vernunft, oder dem göttlichen 
Willen ergebenden gesellschaftlichen Ordnung wäre die Tätigkeit des staatlichen Gesetzgebers der 
törichte Versuch einer künstlichen Beleuchtung bei hellstem Sonnenlicht.’ 
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Each of these four positions which Kelsen describes in quick succession in the Reine 
Rechtslehre (I) has, with or without Kelsen’s influence, become a core assumption 
underlying much of modern legal positivism. Ad (i), since all categorical imperatives, 
whether the Kantian or some other version such as ‘seek the good’, are ultimately 
tautological, it is not possible to use any such norm as a basis for ‘finding’ norms that are 
objectively valid independent of the positive law; ad (ii), even if it would be possible to 
identify norms that are objectively valid independent of the positive law, it would not follow 
that such norms should become the basis of a legal order – this would entail a category 
mistake by applying a logic of existence, e.g. the principle of non-contradiction, to 
normativity; ad (iii), because of (i) and (ii), all legal norms merely reflect social interests 
and, since all such interests are completely relative to social inputs which by their nature 
are mutable, the proper object of legal theory is not the interests themselves but rather an 
ordering of these interests through a system of secondary norms;3 ad (iv) legal positivism is 
justified ex negativo – other forms of legal theory, e.g. natural legal theories, could be 
justifiable (and would be preferable) were it not for positions (i) – (iii), positions (i) – (iii) 
being the case, however, legal positivism is the only viable theory. 
Upon closer examination, positions (i) and (iii), together with the conclusion (iv) orbit 
around the central proposition (ii) that a logic of norms entails predicating truth of value 
and that such an undertaking is impossible, violating the is-ought distinction. I believe that 
the theory of legal norms which Felix Somló develops in the Juristische Grundlehre attacks 
the heart of this position by attempting to demonstrate that which Kelsen deemed 
impossible. In doing this, Somló shows:
a) the viability of categorically imperative order;
b) the logical relation of norms with each other;
c) that legal norms cannot be reduced to mere reflections of immediate social interests; 
and, importantly,
d) the project of legal positivism is nonetheless crucial for our understanding of legal 
order even if (a) through (c) hold. 
In retracing this argument, I hope to show the necessity of reconsidering Somló’s 
theory for a revised theory of law for the 21st century.
2. THE STARTING POSITION
For the purpose of best realizing the importance of Somló’s work for a new interpretation 
of legal theory, it is perhaps best to start with that other theorist who gives John Austin’s 
work a prominent role in his theory. In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart claimed that law 
can most adequately be defined as the union of primary and secondary rules.4 Primary rules 
he defines as those under which ‘human beings are required to do or abstain from certain 
3 I use here the Hartian terminology of secondary norms as hierarchical norms. The terminology 
is confusing because Kelsen considers the primary function of legal norms to lie in their hierarchical 
function, i.e. as directives on which officials are to act. Accordingly, Kelsen allows that norms could 
be considered to have a secondary aspect as being directed to affect the behaviour of individual 
subjects. See Kelsen (1934) 30. Somló’s terminology is again different, according to which primary 
rules (or sources of law) are those which come directly from the sovereign (Rechtsmacht) and 
secondary rules (or sources of law) are those that come from a political body (Staatsorgan), see also 
Somló (1927) § 100.
4 Hart (1994) 79.
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actions.’ Secondary rules include those according to which ‘human beings may by doing or 
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type.’5 According to Hart, primary 
rules directly concern human actions whereas secondary rules provide for operations 
according to which duties or obligations to act are created or modified. The two conceptions 
of rules are essential for Hart because he claims that a legal system precisely consists of 
certain primary rules which obtain their validity and legal character from other secondary 
rules. Thus, a certain primary rule such as ‘you should not steal’ would be a law if there was 
a corresponding secondary rule to the effect of ‘the legislature or other law-making body 
has the power to impose the duty that you should not steal.’ Hart claims that a top-down 
ordering of the law i.e., the existence of in-themselves normatively binding secondary rules, 
is necessary to ensure that the corresponding legal order is endowed with certainty, 
efficiency and dynamism.
By conceiving of the law within this top-down framework, Hart seems to develop his 
theory within the most straightforward context possible, i.e., it is part and parcel of 
individual legal norms that they exist within a hierarchical structure of norms. After all, 
what else could the relation between sovereign and subject be but that between master and 
servant? One of the constants of legal theory is that the sovereign has the power to enact 
laws independent of the subject’s consent, precisely as a master over a servant. Besides, this 
framing of the law within a hierarchically normative framework also fits well within 
Kelsen’s basic view and, on Hart’s characterization, Austin’s as well. Despite the fact that 
Hart argues primarily against Austin’s conception in The Concept of Law, Hart’s basic 
argument is that the necessary complement to Austin’s theory of sovereignty, the habit of 
obedience and commands backed by threats, is the unification of primary and secondary 
rules through a rule recognizing the hierarchical structure of the legal order. While Hart’s 
Rule of Recognition reduces the legal order to a question of social fact and therefore 
fundamentally opposes the normative stance of Kelsen’s Grundnorm, both Hart and Kelsen 
are united in their opposition to the possibility of validity actually inhering within a legal 
order. Despite their many differences, for the present purposes Hart and Kelsen are both the 
heroes of current mainstream legal theory (characterized by (i) through (iii) above) and the 
main antagonists of (the following interpretation of) Somló’s conception of law. 
The opposition of both Hart and Kelsen to an inherent validity of the law is hardly 
surprising given the shared premise that the legal system consists of a hierarchy of arbitrary 
norms cascading from sovereign to subject. In such a case, either (1) Rex’s laws are 
endowed with inherent validity (i.e. a non-starting totalitarianism), (2) the validity of Rex’s 
laws is fictional (i.e. Kelsen’s ultimate position) or (3) the validity of Rex’s laws comes 
from the factual recognition of the legal system as such (i.e. Hart’s position). Given a liberal 
democratic predilection, Hart and Kelsen cannot but adopt either (2) or (3) or some variation 
thereof. Nonetheless, each of the above scenarios presumes a certain kind of sovereignty 
which actually begs the question to an even more fundamental question of the law. By 
rejecting all three of the options, Somló opens a path towards a new frontier of legal 
analysis altogether.
5 Hart (1994) 79.
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3. THE FLUX OF SOVEREIGNTY – INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVES
The elephant in the room for both Kelsen’s and Hart’s theories is the concept of sovereignty. 
While Kelsen clearly sees the sovereign (or state) as a legal construct and Hart sees it being 
closely tied to factual recognition of a hierarchical system, neither are able to successfully 
answer the question of why it exists in the first place. In the moral aspect, we ask why we 
should follow the law, in the sociological aspect, we ask why do individuals almost 
universally group themselves together into collectives, and in the legal aspect, we ask what 
is the nature of sovereign relations such that some individuals command and others (must) 
follow. Even if we should dismiss these first two (moral and sociological) aspects as being 
irrelevant for a legal theoretical investigation, they are bound to nonetheless be present 
when conducting the ‘strictly’ legal analysis. 
In fairness to Hart, Kelsen and much of 20th century theory, the issue of sovereignty is 
one of the most perplexing issues of the modern state and indeed suffers from a taint of 
traditionalism or even totalitarianism. Where sovereignty was once thought to adhere to 
God or to God’s representatives on earth, the absolute power concept of sovereignty as it 
has existed since Bodin and, on some interpretations, Hobbes, is hardly but a secular 
equivalent of the same. Nonetheless, it is hardly surprising that in failing to address the 
nature of sovereignty, why and how it exists, Kelsen and Hart also failed to give’ satisfactory 
accounts of value and validity in the law. Presupposing the existence of an absolute 
sovereign, Hart and Kelsen presuppose the hierarchical tendency of norms within legal 
systems and therefore have to start from precisely the wrong assumption.
In contrast to his mainstream counterparts, Somló is able to free himself from these 
preconceptions of sovereignty and instead begins his investigation in the Juristische 
Grundlehre not by asking how legal norms are related to the sovereign, but rather how 
norms generally are related to collectives and the individuals that constitute them. Somló 
defines the legal norm in § 26 as a normative expression (Willenssatzung) of a sovereign:
Legal norms are expressions of will, […] which are derived from the still to be 
determined ‘highest power’ on which the entire concept of law is based and upon the 
determination of which everything else depends.6 
The Juristische Grundlehre begins with a discussion of norms most generally. It is 
important for Somló that each norm, regardless of its kind, ‘wants’ to be valid. In other 
words, the nature of all prescriptions and directives, in short all ‘oughts’, is that their 
internal logic is to be followed. Of course, we do not typically follow all norms that are 
addressed to us or that we perhaps happen to come upon. Rather, we only follow those 
which we deem significant in one way or another. For this reason, each of us is constantly 
ordering or systematizing a system of norms, discarding or relegating some norms as out 
of fashion or antiquated, and prioritizing others as of particular relevance. In a moment of 
national crisis, we might emphasize norms of patriotism. As society develops and traditions 
6 Somló (1927) § 26, p. 86: ‘Die Rechtsnormen sind demnach Willenssatzungen, […] die von 
der noch näher zu bestimmenden ‘höchsten Macht’ herrühren, auf deren Begriff der ganze 
Rechtsbegriff abgestellt ist und auf deren Bestimmung nun mehr alles weitere ankommt.’
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are lost, we might choose to disregard the norms of our grandparents, such as removing 
one’s hat upon entering a church. In this sea of norms, each of which is fighting for 
superiority,7 some gain the highest status of being the law. In Somló’s definition, these are 
the norms which issue from the highest power, or sovereign and, as such, the initial function 
of sovereignty is simply that it is the differentia specifica of legal norms in contrast with all 
other norms. 
Any time there is a collective, e.g. a church community, a country club, a criminal 
gang, a professional or industry association, a league of nations, the collective must 
necessarily issue norms that are heteronomous to its individual members as a means of 
organizing behavior for the good, or integrity, of the organization. Since the norms are 
heteronomous to the members’ own will, it will not always be convenient or desirable for 
them to act accordingly. In such a situation, they may choose to leave the collective, even 
though there is a general habit of obedience on their part and that of others, as long as the 
collective, e.g., the country club, is only a relative power. As long as it is an option to switch 
to a different country club or to quit playing golf altogether, the by-laws of the country club 
do not in themselves enjoy the force of law. A country club only applies to a particular set 
of individuals and it is voluntary. Since there is no general habit of obedience on the part of 
everyone i.e., non-members, and since even those for whom there is a general habit 
of obedience may at any time exit the collective, a country club is an unlikely candidate for 
sovereignty. However, there are other collectives, the rules of which apply to everyone and 
from which there is no exit clause – these are the highest powers, the sovereigns, from which 
legal norms issue. That such sovereigns exist is not an empirical matter of fact, but, as with 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm, a legal a priori resulting from the necessity of the jurist to understand 
and order the social world as a normative unity, without the possibility of conflict. 
Somló’s definition of law quite clearly follows Austin’s conception of law as the 
commands of a sovereign which enjoys a habit of obedience. However, whereas this 
Austinian framework is typically interpreted as ‘imperial’8 or hierarchical in nature, Somló 
gives the Austinian frame a decidedly non-imperial, non-hierarchical flavor. As such, for 
Somló, order is not a function of sovereignty, but rather sovereignty is a function of order. 
If there is no order as a matter of fact, then there is no sovereign and thus also no legal 
norm – a scenario of the Hobbesian state of war.9 However, if an order does exist, then 
7 See Somló (1927) § 28, p. 90: ‘Wir kommen also zu dem Ergebnis, dass jede Normart den 
übrigen gegenüber Selbstherrlich ist, und folglich die übrigen auch verletzen kann. The slightly more 
metaphorical phrasing can be found in Somló (1926): ‘Begriffe sind harmlose, weder streitsüchtige, 
noch herrschsüchtige Bedeutungen, es sind friedlich, neben einander stehende Lämmchen in den 
Gefilden der lauteren Bedeutungen; sie tun sich gegenseitig nichts Zuleide. Anders die Sätze. Jeder 
von Ihnen hat die Mitbedeutung der unbedingten Geltung, der Richtigkeit. In jedem besonderen 
Satzsinne ist der Sinn mit Inbegriffen, dass es ein unbedingt gültiger Satz sei. Es ist ein Geschlecht 
von kampflustigen, herrschsüchtigen, sich befehdenden oder sich gegen andere verbündenden 
Bedeutungen.’
8 See Bix (2018).
9 See Somló (1927) § 31, p. 99: ‘Alle Zeiten, in denen diese bestimmt geartete oberste Macht in 
Bezug auf bestimmte Menschenkreise nicht zustande kommt, sind rechtlose. Wenn z. B. ein 
Bürgerkrieg lange und unentschieden wütet, wenn allgemeiner Aufruhr an Stelle der Ordnung tritt, 
wenn eine äußere Macht die bestehende Staatsgewalt niederwirft, sich aber nicht behaupten kann und 
auch sonst keine Macht zustande kommt, deren Normen allgemein befolgt werden, so besteht eben zu 
solchen Zeiten kein Recht. Allerdings wird sich ein solcher Zustand nicht lange erhalten. Die 
allgemeine Zügellosigkeit und Unordnung würde den betreffenden Kreis bald vernichten. Denn, und 
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there must be a principally unifying factor which Somló calls the highest power (höchste 
Macht) or sovereign. That there is a sovereign though, does not establish wherein, or with 
whom, sovereignty lies. Actually locating this highest power for a given society at a given 
time can be arduous. Nonetheless, the fact that one sovereign exists for any ordered society 
is a matter of certainty resulting from the fact that every society is a collective and every 
collective in some necessary way exerts power over its individuals.
There is a certain circularity in Somló’s logic. The legal norm issues from the sovereign 
which is present if and only if there is a legal order, presumably a collection of legal norms 
that are present if and only if there is a sovereign. Which comes first the sovereign or the 
law? This question of priority or genesis does not present itself with the classical imperial, 
hierarchical or monarchical picture in which God or Rex (king) rescue lost souls from a 
state of disorder. In contrast with this classical view, Somló’s conception opens a pandora’s 
box of unknowns, which have no apparently clear solution. Somló says that any 
jurisprudential analysis of constitutional law requires as its foundation an historical and 
sociological investigation of the particular qualities of sovereignty in that state.10 He states 
that to say that the author of a legal norm is a sovereign is only to refer to such author’s 
ability to generally realize (succeed with) his norms or, in other words, to cause them to be 
followed.11 Further, Somló says that there is a close mental connection between the habit of 
obedience and all other factors of societal and political culture, thus giving the notion of 
obedience its inexhaustible nuance.12 Finally, he qualifies that a sovereign may be the 
sovereign as long as it (or he or she) enacts law in a particular way. As soon as the sovereign 
goes against certain beliefs or preconceptions though, it may cease to be the sovereign.13
Whereas Kelsen, Hart and most of mainstream legal positivism establish clear rules for 
recognizing legal authority within a territory, Somló’s theory is almost created as if to 
establish the greatest degree of uncertainty possible. Most theorists, even natural law 
theorists, acknowledge the importance of clear rules establishing a line of authority from 
the highest legislator to the lowest administrator. Somló, on the other hand, would hold that 
a line of authority can only be of use on the assumption that the highest legislator identified 
by such rules is actually the sovereign in the territory and that such sovereign has actually 
issued a corresponding system of secondary norms. However, if the legal norms are really 
the commands of a sovereign which enjoys a habit of obedience, then there can certainly be 
das sei besonders betont, nur allgemeine Zügellosigkeit und Aufruhr kann Platz greifen, wenn das 
Recht aufhört zu sein. Es muss kein Recht geben, aber die Alternative lautet: entweder rechtlich 
geregelter Zustand oder jener bellum omnium contra omnes des Hobbes.’ 
10 Somló (1927) § 95, p. 314: ‘Jede juristische Behandlung eines gegebenen Staatsrechts 
erfordert als Grundlage eine historisch-soziale Untersuchung über die Beschaffenheit der Rechtsmacht 
in jenem Staate.’
11 Somló (1927) § 36, p. 108, 109: ‘Die Bezeichnung des Urhebers von Rechtsnormen als einer 
Macht bedeutet weiter nichts, als seine Fähigkeit zum gewöhnlichen Verwirklichen seiner Normen, 
mit anderen Worten: zur Verursachung ihrer Befolgung.’
12 Somló (1927) § 37, p. 111, citing F. Klein: ‘Der Rechtsgehorsam ist mit allen Faktoren der 
Gesellschaftskultur und des Staatslebens in engem geistigen Zusammenhang, und das gibt ihm seine 
unerschöpflichen Nuancen.’
13 Somló (1927) § 40, p. 119: ‘Solange ein Machthaber in einer bestimmten Weise Recht schafft, 
mag er als Rechtsmacht gelten. Sobald er aber gewisse Überzeugungen verletzt, hört er auf, 
Rechtsmacht zu sein.’
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norms that exist outside of the standard hierarchical framework of legislator, administrator, 
judge. Since no sovereign can be bound by a clean ‘scientific’ (hierarchical) ordering of 
norms, it is always possible for a sovereign to contradict such a system through the express 
or implied issuance of law. As such, immediate legislation, which Somló calls a primary 
source of law, always trumps mediate legislation (secondary sources in Somló’s 
terminology).14 Combining this openness with respect to the sources of law, the additional 
factor that both mediate and immediate sources of law can issue both express and implied 
norms, then the determination of the content of the law goes from a fairly dry, clerical 
activity of deducing one paragraph from another to a seemingly impossible task of divining 
the content of any one norm from a nearly infinite universe of meaning. Somló succeeds in 
accounting for a much more generalized concept of law, i.e. one which aligns much more 
closely with law’s principle condition – sovereignty. However, in doing so, Somló seems to 
destroy much of the foundation which theorists have used in attempting to develop a 
‘scientific’ theory of law.
Let us now look at the possibilities of regaining such a foundation in Somló’s own 
theory.
4. PLURALE TANTUM
Since the concept of a norm requires that its claim be acted upon, each system of 
norms, through its own author, is completely independent of every other system 
of norms. Every system is able to lay claim without recourse (or concern) for other 
kinds of norms. Thus, every system of norms delineates itself.15 
Whatever is sovereign at one point in time need not be the sovereign at another. Even 
if the establishment of one and the same sovereign can be postulated, there is no guarantee 
that the norms of any one governmental body, i.e. a secondary source, actually reflect the 
will of the sovereign and therefore are to be counted as law. Even if they do reflect 
the sovereign’s will today, there is no guarantee that they will do so tomorrow. However, 
if the sovereign is that entity or person which enjoys a generalized habit of obedience on 
the part of subjects and if legal norms are those norms which issue from a sovereign, it must 
follow that legal norms are those that are generally and habitually obeyed. Somló insists 
that this ‘generalized’ quality of the law, i.e., that a sovereign and therefore also a legal 
system can only exist if it encompasses a sufficiently broad scope of human conduct, results 
in the fact that no one legal norm can be understood or even conceptualized as an isolated 
entity. The legal norm can only be understood as a plurale tantum,16 i.e. in the plural form. 
14 See Somló (1927) §§ 100, 101.
15 Somló (1927) § 28, p. 90: ‘Da es zum Begriffe der Norm gehört, die Verwirklichung einer 
Forderung zu verlangen, so ist jedes durch einen besonderen Urheber von den übrigen Arten 
abgegrenzte System von Normen von diesen übrigen Arten vollkommen unabhängig. Jedes vermag 
zu fordern ohne Rücksicht auf die anderen Normarten, jedes System von Normen bestimmt 
dementsprechend seine eigenen Grenzen selbst.’
16 Somló (1927) § 30, p. 98: ‘Aus dem hier entwickelten Begriff der Rechtsmacht folgt zugleich, 
dass es eine Rechtsnorm als isolierte Einheit, ohne dass sie zugleich einer Vielheit von Schwestern 
angehörte, nicht geben kann. Darin, dass eine Macht ein weites Gebiet von Lebensverhältnissen 
normativ ergreifen muss, um zu einer Rechtsmacht werden zu können, ist bereits die Erkenntnis 
enthalten, dass es eine Rechtsnorm für sich gar nicht geben kann, sondern dass solche in der 
Wirklichkeit immer nur als ein begriffliches plurale oder besser gesagt multum tantum vorkommen 
235VALIDITY AS A FUNCTION OF MEANING IN SOMLÓ’S JURISTISCHE GRUNDLEHRE
or, as Somló says, as one within a brotherhood of other norms.17 If this is the case, then the 
task of understanding the law can be nothing but the task of understanding volition as it 
exists in the interplay between sovereign and subject. As such, the task of legal science is 
not so much to identify particular legal norms or to identify a particular sovereign. Rather, 
it is to understand the nature of the legal order, this plurale tantum that governs the relation 
between the individual and the collective.
Somló insists that his theory is no longer an epistemological theory of law, but rather 
an axiological, or value-based theory.18 This certainly does not mean that Somló advocates 
for an ideological approach to law in which one value, e.g., patriotism or religion, 
determines the science of law. Rather, Somló’s position is that proper jurisprudential activity 
lies in weighing norms, or value propositions, against each other. For Kelsen, the 
normativity of the law only persists within the sphere of secondary rules (governmental 
bodies). As such, there can very seldom be true conflicts of law and jurisprudential activity 
is therefore limited to the epistemological task of ordering administrative actions within the 
context of the legal system. Since conflicts rarely arise and, when they do, they can normally 
be finally resolved by following the hierarchical rules of the legal system, the Kelsenian 
jurist need never decide upon a question of value. For Somló, on the other hand, juridical 
inquiry can only be a question of value and, since all norms (moral, aesthetic, grammatical, 
etc.) can be seen as coming to us unfiltered, it is the jurist’s first task to determine which of 
the multitude of norms are actually legal norms and which of the legal norms supersede 
each other in a system of norms. The method which Somló must employ in theorizing such 
a system of jurisprudence is neither solely axiological nor solely epistemological but rather 
necessarily both axiological and epistemological.
Somló follows his Neo-Kantian peers by insisting that legal science is a normative 
science in that its object clearly entails a system of norms. However, in contrast to at least 
Kelsen, Somló does not hesitate at all in acknowledging the importance of fact for legal 
science. A legal system can only be understood from the legal perspective as a system of 
norms, i.e., ought-sentences that seek to guide human conduct. However, much of any 
putative system of norms is simply incomprehensible if considered within a normative 
vacuum. Legal norms themselves issue from a sovereign (or in accordance with the basic 
norm). This sovereign itself (as well as the validity of the basic norm) depends on a general 
habit of obedience, which is ultimately a factual quality – even if Hart calls the same 
attribute a ‘rule’ of recognition. More importantly, as quoted from Somló above, legal 
norms want and demand to be followed. Somló’s personification of norms is poetic. 
However, what he really means is that the sovereign, who immediately or mediately issues 
können. Es ist damit zugleich der Wahrheit Ausdruck verliehen, dass dasjenige, was wir bisher als 
Rechtsnorm bezeichnet und zum Ausgangspunkt unserer Untersuchung gemacht haben, nur als Teil 
eines Ganzes gedacht werden kann. Der Begriff einer Rechtsnorm weist über sich selbst hinaus auf 
das Ganze einer von einem einheitlichen Urheber getragenen Vielheit von Rechtsnormen. Dieses 
Ganze nennen wir Rechtsordnung. See also § 112: ‘Jeder Rechtssatz gilt und bindet nur in notwendiger 
Wechselwirkung mit einer unbegrenzten Zahl anderer Normen, die ihn näher bestimmen, 
einschränken, oder in näherer oder entfernterer Beziehung ergänzen… Es gibt gar keine einzelne 
Rechtsnorm für sich – die einzelne Rechtsnorm ist nur eine künstliche Isolierung –, es gibt nur 
Rechtsnormen, die in ihrem Zusammenhange gelten; es gibt nur eine Rechtsordnung, und nur 
dadurch, dass eine Norm dieser angehört, wird sie zu einer Rechtsnorm.’
17 Somló (1926) 44.
18 Somló (1927) § 30, p. 98.
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a legal norm, does so wanting the norm to be obeyed. If the issuance itself is expressed then 
it is a communicative act. Even if it is not express, the issuance in any case creates a 
normative relation between the sovereign and subject as they exist in fact. Whether as a 
communicative act or a mere normative relation, the legal norm cannot be understood as 
it exists in the legal system without taking into account the factual circumstance of the 
issuer who utters or implies the norm, nor of the addressee whose conduct the issuer seeks 
to direct. While as a strictly theoretical matter it is possible to view the legal norm outside 
of any such factual context, to do so ignores that that with which the law is actually 
concerned is the volition of individuals, whether sovereigns, subjects or administrative 
officials. This volition is incomprehensible without addressing the interplay of norm and 
fact in the intentionality of human beings.19 
If every norm only exists as part of a whole, the plurale tantum, then the relation in 
question is not one between the individual and a particular norm seeking to guide his 
conduct, but rather one between an individual and the entirety of the normative order itself. 
5. THE LOGICAL SENTENCE
Much of the Juristische Grundlehre, including most of the considerations outlined above, 
consists more of questions of sovereignty, state and collectives than of the analysis of the 
strict functioning of a system of norms. Questions of law presuppose questions of state and 
a general theory of law requires a preliminary investigation of the theory of state – the 
postulate of the norm as plurale tantum suggests as much. This approach is validated when 
Somló turns to analyzing legal norms proper at the beginning of the second part of the 
Juristische Grundlehre. 
The most important passages for the present reconstruction can be found in the Sixth 
Chapter on ‘Legal Norm and Legal Text’, as well as the 11th and 12th Chapters, ‘Sources 
of Law’ and ‘Legal Interpretation (and Application)’ and, very importantly, Somló’s 
posthumously published, uncompleted manuscript on a theory of validity and truth, 
Gedanken zu einer ersten Philosophie (1926). In these passages, Somló makes the first 
steps toward a theory of sentences, norms and meaning which capitalize on his innovative 
insights regarding norms and sovereignty discussed above. It is ultimately Somló’s theory 
of language, likely influenced by Bolzano,20 that is the key to understanding his theory of 
sovereignty and normativity. 
In the first paragraph, § 60, of the Second Part of the Juristische Grundlehre, Somló 
makes a relatively innocuous observation in distinguishing the logical from the grammatical 
sense of the general sentence:
We would now like to return to the general concept of law, even traversing one step 
beyond. For this purpose we differentiate between the logical sentence, or sentence of 
meaning, and the grammatical sentence, or the sentence of speaking.21
19 For John Searle, institutional reality always consists in a status function, that is a norm, to 
which he attributes the variable ‚y’ as it exists in the (factual) context ‚c’. Normativity can only be 
understood within its appropriate factual context. Outside of such context, as Kelsen’s project attests, 
normativity loses all meaning and becomes a shell of itself.
20 See Somló (1926) 13.
21 Somló (1927) § 60, p. 179: ‘Wir wollen uns nunmehr vor allem zum Oberbegriff des Rechts 
zurückwenden und sogar noch einen Schritt nach oben hin über ihn hinaus tun. Wir unterscheiden zu 
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Every sentence has a logical and a grammatical aspect.22 The grammatical aspect is 
that which is spoken (or written) at face value. The logical aspect is the meaning that 
is contained in the spoken sentence. Every normal, i.e. communicative, sentence must have 
a logical content, i.e. a meaning, and, at least within the realm of a verbal language, every 
meaning must be expressed within a grammatical form. Any given meaning could be 
expressed in a multitude of ‘grammatical’ sentences and any (normal) grammatical sentence 
presents a multitude of possible interpretations, i.e., possible meanings. This distinction 
itself is not novel. Somló himself indicates in the footnotes to §§ 60 and 61 several 
predecessors and contemporaries who have made similar distinctions, including Kelsen23 as 
well as Windelband and Wundt, the latter of whom gave the name judgment (Urteil) to that 
which Somló calls ‘logical sense’ or ‘meaning’.
What is interesting about this distinction for Somló is that it seems to lead him to a 
theory of legal norms quite unlike other theories held by his Neo-Kantian contemporaries 
and unlike any other legal theorists since, but which, at the same time, predicts a significant 
strand of the philosophy of language in the 20th century, perhaps best exemplified by 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of language, use and meaning in the Philosophical Investigations. 
It is highly relevant that, in developing a theory of norms as a theory of normative meaning 
connecting sovereign and subject, Somló is able to develop a robust alternative to the 
Kelsenian theory, an alternative that is at once value-laden, because of the role of meaning 
inherent in the contextualization of sentences, and positivistic, as a result of such meanings 
being created by us. 
Somló states in § 60 that the grammatical (spoken) sentence can be considered as an 
isolated sentence (isolierter Satz) whereas the logical sentence can be considered as the 
sentence in context (Satz im Zusammenhang). The typical method for understanding the 
grammatical, or formal, sentence lies in understanding the normal meaning of its constitutive 
words together with the grammatical relations expressed in the sentence. The logical 
sentence, on the other hand, cannot be determined exclusively by its grammatical form. 
While the grammatical form is one element in determining the meaning of a sentence, i.e. 
the logical sentence, there are many other circumstances which serve to fully contextualize 
it and thereby disambiguate its meaning.24 
diesem Zweck den Begriff des logischen oder des Bedeutungssatzes vom Begriff des grammatischen 
oder des Sprachsatzes.’
22 The logical meaning of a sentence as described here has nothing to do with the logical 
operators or quantifiers which might be used in translating a grammatical sentence of a natural 
language into a symbolic and abstract form. Indeed, the notion that a logical meaning of a sentence 
can exist independently of its grammatical form stands quite at odds with the tenets of logical 
positivism developed by the Vienna Circle shortly after Somló’s departure. Here, Somló stands firmly 
in Bolzano’s footsteps and as a harbinger of the later Wittgenstein. 
23 See Kelsen (1923) 238, FN 1: ‘Es wäre ein arger Irrtum, wollte man den Rechtssatz, der erst 
aus den konkreten Gesetzen herauskonstruiert werden muss, mit einem der Sätze im grammatischen 
Sinne identifizieren, aus denen die konkreten Gesetzen aufgebaut werden. Es ist selbstverständlich, 
dass aus rein ästhetisch-stilistischen und auch aus anderen gesetztechnischen Gründen die eine 
Rechtspflicht statuierende ideale Norm mit allen ihren wesentlichen Bestandteilen tatsächlich auch im 
konkreten Gesetze nicht in einem einzigen Satz stilisiert wird, sondern hier in zahlreiche Sätze 
verschiedenster Struktur aufgelöst, ja sogar häufig auf zwei oder mehrere Gesetze verteilt erscheint. 
Sache der juristischen Konstruktion ist es, die ideale Norm aus diesen Teilen zusammenzusetzen.’ 
24 Somló (1927) § 60, p. 181.
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In a way, Kelsen also draws the same basic distinction (FN 22). However, his 
distinction is much more formalistic in nature. Kelsen rightly points out that the grammatical 
sentence ‘Murder shall be punished with ten years’ imprisonment’ cannot be understood as 
a legal norm (Rechtssatz) without taking into account other complementary grammatical 
sentences such as ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of another human without justification’; 
‘Imprisonment is the forced confinement by the state to an institution’, etc. Kelsen would 
make the unobjectionable claim that a single sentence written in a legal code is itself rarely 
if ever a sufficient basis for understanding the actual legal norm which it is meant to 
express. Instead, in order to properly identify the applicable norm, one would have to first 
set out all other relevant textual evidence, e.g., the applicable constitutional, legislative, and 
administrative provisions. Only upon considering this evidence would it be possible to 
make a proper judgment about the legal norm underlying the given text. What Kelsen does 
not seem to advocate is that the jurist would need to consult extra textual sources. Kelsen’s 
proposed method is one of rule formalism or rule empiricism. Once the jurist’s consideration 
extends beyond the admissible textual sources, the jurist then ceases trying to understand 
the legal norm as it exists and instead himself becomes involved in legislation.25 Such 
activity would no longer involve knowing but rather willing.26 Kelsen’s caution in the face 
of politicizing the judiciary is well-placed and his position with respect to textual 
interpretation largely reflects contemporary jurisprudential orthodoxy as a practical matter. 
Nonetheless, Kelsen’s empirical approach to interpretation reflects his empirical and 
relativistic approach to the concept of law in general which, upon closer examination of 
Somló’s insights, must be rejected.
Somló’s main points applying the distinction between the grammatical and logical 
sentence are insightful in this regard, indicating the limitation of an overly formalistic 
concept of law and the naïve understanding of sovereignty and meaning which it entails. 
On the one hand, Somló states that there are limitations regarding how the sovereign 
can change existing law. For example, it could be the case that legislation is issued 
which, despite its compliant grammatical ‘ought’ form and formal compliance with 
legislative procedure, actually does not contain a normative meaning or contains a 
normative meaning which adds no normative content to the existing system, i.e., is 
25 Kelsen (1934), § 39, p. 99: ‘Sofern bei der Gesetzesanwendung über die dabei nötige 
Feststellung des Rahmens, innerhalb dessen sich der zu setzende Akt zu halten hat, hinaus noch eine 
Erkenntnistätigkeit Platz greifen kann, ist es nicht eine Erkenntnis des positiven Rechts, sondern 
anderer Normen, die hier in den Prozess der Rechtserzeugung einmünden können; Normen der Moral, 
der Gerechtigkeit, soziale Werturteile, die man mit den Schlagworten Volkswohl, Staatsinteresse, 
Fortschritt, u.s.w. zu bezeichnen pflegt. Über deren Geltung und Feststellbarkeit lässt sich vom 
Standpunkt des positiven Rechts nichts aussagen.’
26 Kelsen (1934), § 39, p. 99: ‘[Die Reine Rechtslehre] zerstört die Meinung, dass im Wege der 
Erkenntnis Normen neu geschaffen werden könnten; eine Meinung die letztlich dem Bedürfnis 
entspringt, sich das Recht als eine feste Ordnung vorzustellen, die das menschliche Verhalten, 
insbesondere aber die Tätigkeit der Rechtsanwendenden Organe, der Gerichte vor allem allseits 
bestimmt; so dass deren Funktion und sohin auch die Interpretation nur als das Finden schon 
vorhandener und daher nur in einem besonderen Verfahren aufzudeckender Normen anzusehen ist.’
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redundant, or is incomprehensible within the system.27 Even if legislation is enacted which 
does succeed in expressing a normative meaning or shifting the normative framework, such 
a norm must and can only be understood within the context of the entirety of the legal 
system.28 A legal definition, but also a legal norm, is not any less binding than any other 
norm issuing from the sovereign. However, it is also not any more binding.29 Somló 
concludes his discussion on this point by stating:
The goal of [jurisprudence] is to reproduce the relevant normative content. However, 
in doing so, it need neither use the same words as the legislator nor even the same 
concepts. Indeed, one of the jurist’s most noble tasks is to formulate in appropriate 
concepts the normative content the jurisprudential method has determined.30
This particular discussion in §§ 60– 62 as well as §§ 110 – 115 applies directly to the 
interpretation of written texts. However, Somló’s scope, and the importance of the general 
distinction between logical and grammatical sentences, extends far beyond textual 
interpretation. Legal formalism acknowledges that any written law can be ambiguous, but 
establishes rules for resolving any ambiguity in favor of ‘sticking to’ the text. Somló’s 
theory presents quite the opposite approach. For Somló, that which is real and valid about a 
norm has no inherent connection to that which is written down, although the written text is 
certainly one evidence among many. For Somló, the logical sentence exists independently 
of any expressed form and is conditioned only by all other logical sentences with which it 
co-exists. 
Most jurists would readily acknowledge that the structure of law involves at its core 
the use of force by a state against individuals and that, at least in a fairly developed legal 
system, the means by which such force is carried out is through the written word. This is 
certainly also true for Somló. And yet, I believe that Somló was on to something much 
more fundamental in the Juristische Grundlehre with his concept of sovereignty as variable, 
the legal norm as plurale tantum and the distinction between logical and grammatical 
sentence. Somló was working on a general theory of the collective as expressed in the law.
27 Somló (1927) § 62, p. 185: ‘Ob nun in irgendwelchen von der Rechtsmacht ausgehenden 
Sätzen überhaupt Normen enthalten sind oder nicht, ist eine Tatsachenfrage. Findet sich in einem 
Gesetz z.B. eine Einteilung, die zu seinem Verständnis überhaupt nichts beiträgt und die auch vom 
Gesichtspunkt des Wortgebrauchs des Gesetzgebers gänzlich unerheblich ist, so ist sie keine Norm.
28 Somló (1927) § 62, p. 186: ‘Sie [legal definitions] dürfen, wie die Sätze der Rechtsmacht 
überhaupt, nicht aus ihrem Zusammenhang herausgerissen für sich und auch nicht rein ihrer 
grammatischen Form nach beurteilt werden, sondern sind mit den übrigen [i.e. definitions and other 
legal norms] in Zusammenhang zu bringen. Wenn dies gelingt, so gewinnen sie Anteil an der 
logischen Struktur der übrigen Sätze und erweisen sich dadurch als Normen.’
29 Somló (1927) § 62, p. 186: ‘Die in der Form einer Legaldefinition ausgedrückte Norm ist 
also einerseits um nichts weniger verbindlich als andere Normen der Rechtsmacht; sie ist aber 
andererseits natürlich auch um nichts verbindlicher.’
30 Somló (1927) § 62, p. 187: ‘[Jurisprudenz] hat den Norminhalt wiederzugeben, aber sie 
braucht es weder mit den Worten zu tun, die der Gesetzgeber dazu verwendet hat, noch mit denselben 
Begriffen; ja es ist eben eine ihrer vornehmsten Aufgaben, den ermittelten Norminhalt in 
entsprechendere Begriffe umzuleeren.’
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6. SOVEREIGNTY AS A FUNCTION OF VALIDITY –  
CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS
The meeting place of the factual and the normative is the human mind. A sovereign can 
have a desire, issue a norm on account of this desire and thereby change the world. A subject 
can understand a norm and change his conduct on its account. Each of the two preceding 
sentences presents a sequence of a fact interchanging with a norm which interchanges with 
a fact. In each such case, normativity cannot be understood outside of the fact of human 
intentionality. In each such case, normativity can also not be understood outside of language. 
Language is that which connects normativity to the mind. Only if a language is capable of 
creating sentences with absolute validity can a mind be rational, connected to the world.31 
Of course, such sentences are not the grammatical sentences of fact which themselves have 
no meaning, but rather the logical sentences of normativity. 
This paper asserts, with Somló, that legal norms are to be understood as a plurale 
tantum, that expressions of law derive from a logical form and, the title of this section, that 
sovereignty is actually a function of validity. Somló says that the initial perception is 
nothing but evidence or perhaps intuition and that these raw impressions of the world must 
first be formed into thoughts, sentences, before any consideration of validity or correctness 
can be undertaken.32 What holds of mere perception, is also true of communication.33 
All that exists in nature are individuals faced with each other. In order to communicate, or 
to issue a directive, an individual must be able to formulate in language that which he wills 
internally and the other, on the basis of such formulation, together with all other evidence 
and intuition, must try to understand not just that which was expressed as the outer will, but 
also that which exists within the other. Grammatical sentences are all that can ever be 
perceived. Yet, the grammatical sentence as fact is useless. It is only the sentence as thought 
or meaning, the logical sentence, which serves as the normative glue that binds us to one 
another.34
31 See Bolzano (2000) § 17, p. 97, 98: ‘Wer nichts für Gewiss hält, der kann sich der Vernunft, 
dieser edelsten Gabe des Himmels, gar nicht bedienen zu den erhabenen Zwecken, zu welchem sie 
uns von Gott verliehen worden ist. Denn da er das Vermögen, Gutes vom Boesen, Wahres vom 
Falschen zu unterscheiden, nicht zumutet, da er nicht einmal glaubt, dass es irgend etwas, das an sich 
selbst wahr und gut ist, gebe: wie sollte er Lust haben, bei allem was er tun oder nicht tun will, seine 
Vernunft erst zu Rathe zu ziehen! Wie sollte er aufgelegt sein, seine Begierde und; Neigungen durch 
ihre Aussprüche beherrschen zu lassen? Untätig, oder höchstens beschäftigt mit Dingen, die einen 
augenblicklichen Genuss gewähren, ist er nicht fähig, je etwas Grosses zu Stande zu bringen, weil 
alles Grosse erfordert, dass man den Aussprüchen und Berechnungen seiner Vernunft vertraue.’ 
32 See Somló (1926) 42: ‘Das zu Messende, das Material der unbedingten Richtigkeit war und 
ist etwas Psychologisches. Dieses Psychologische führt den Namen Evidenz oder auch Intuition. Alles 
Evidente oder Intuitive ist uns daher nur eine Fragestellung nach unbedingter Gültigkeit selber. 
Evidenzen und Intuitionen können einander widersprechen, d. h. sie können auch irrig sein.’
33 Somló (1927) § 111: ‘Überall, wo die Äußerung eines psychischen Vorganges darauf angelegt 
ist, von anderen aufgenommen zu werden, gilt es, die Kluft zwischen zwei Psychen zu Überbrücken. 
Es bedarf einerseits einer Äußerung des Innenlebens und einer Enträtselung dieser Äußerung 
andererseits.’
34 Bolzano says that there are necessarily so many kinds of formulations of sentences (thoughts) 
as there are possibilities for an individual to express itself. See Bolzano (2000) § 21, p. 111: ‘Es muss 
notwendig so viel Arten von Sätzen geben, als dem Geiste Handlungsweisen des Setzens zukommen.’
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Validity can never attach to the factual itself but rather requires the formulation of a 
sentence, a thought in which a predicate is brought into connection with a subject. Bolzano 
held that prescriptive statements also determine states of affairs such that truth and validity 
could be predicated of such statements: 
The sentence ‘I wish that Cajus were an honest man.’ leaves open the relation which 
exists between Cajus and honesty. However, Cajus and honesty are also not the subject 
and predicate of this sentence. The proper subject of this sentence is the speaker. 
The predicate is the speaker’s wish that Cajus be honest.35
A speaker is neither valid or invalid; Caius himself is neither valid nor invalid; honest 
men themselves are neither valid nor invalid – each of these alone are merely facts and 
facts are always conditional, that is, they do not exist necessarily but are conditioned by 
their givenness in the world. The only thing which is unconditional is a meaning yet 
meanings themselves only have validity in a community of meanings – the plurale tantum.36 
A speaker’s wish for Caius to be honest i.e., that Caius should be honest, will either be valid 
or invalid depending on a host of other sentences. Because facts are always conditional, the 
validity of this statement will not depend on any state of mind, neither of the speaker nor of 
Caius but only on the normative order in which the speaker and Caius act. 
Kelsen, along with most other theorists, presupposes the existence of the sovereign. 
As a result for Kelsen, the sovereign itself is never part of the sentence seeking validation 
and all that Kelsen can validate in his theory of norms is the proposition – ‘Caius should be 
honest’. Kelsen is correct that such propositions cannot be contradicted with the result that 
Kelsen must limit himself to the ‘relative’ validity of a hierarchy of administrative norms. 
However, the picture is drastically different if, with Somló, the concept of sovereignty is 
open. Suddenly, the operative proposition is no longer ‘Caius should be honest’ but rather 
‘S states that ‘Caius should be honest’’. Whether S stating that ‘Caius should be honest’’ is 
a valid statement depends on a jurisprudential inquiry that will entail determining, through 
the principle of non-contradiction, whether S in this case is sovereign (primary source of 
law) or speaks for the sovereign (secondary source of law) and, if so, how ‘Caius should be 
honest’ fits within the entirety of the legal order, the norm as plurale tantum. 
In denying the possibility of a logic of norms, Kelsen denies that there is a universe of 
meaning in the legal realm between subjects. Somló’s work stands for the proposition 
that this is nonetheless possible through the absolute validity of truth which our reason 
requires. At the very end of his Gedanken zu einer Ersten Philosophie, in what remains as a 
fragment, Somló discusses the requirement of absolute validity bottoming out in the concept 
35 Bolzano (2000) § 22, p 115: ‘Der Satz: ich wünschte, dass Cajus ein ehrlicher Mann wäre, 
läßt freilich das Verhältnis, das zwischen Cajus und Ehrlichkeit obwaltet, unbestimmt, Cajus und 
Ehrlichkeit sind aber auch nicht Subject und Prädicat in diesem Satz; sondern das eigentliche Subject 
desselben ist der Sprechende, und das Prädicat, der Wunsch, daß Cajus ein ehrlicher Mann wäre.’
36 See Somló (1926) 25: ‘Solange einem Sinn noch etwas tatsächliches anhängt, zieht ihn dieser 
Erdenrest unerbittlich in die Niederungen des Bedingten hinab. Schlechthin unbedingt sein kann also 
gar niemals eine Tatsache, sondern nur eine Bedeutung, ein Sinn. Der Sinn oder die Bedeutung muss 
also sorgfältig von jedem Erhobensein, Gegebensein, Dasein, Existenz, kurz von jeder Tatsächlichkeit 
losgelöst werden.’
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of truth.37 The validity of an expressed norm (Kelsen’s Rechtssatz) is always conditional 
upon the fact of its expression and therefore can never be absolute. Kelsen is therefore 
correct in stating that a norm as norm, even the basic norm, is never absolute. For Somló 
though, the actual norm, that which bears meaning, cannot be reduced to its mere factual 
expression. As a bearer of meaning, the norm exists not as a grammatical sentence, isolated 
in fact, but rather as a logical sentence, embedded in the context of the plurale tantum. 
Truth can be predicated of such a system of norms because of its coherence, sovereignty 
because of its generality. 
This conception of normativity as a logical whole is only possible given Somló’s 
insistence on the existence of logical sentences, or norms in context with other norms 
connecting issuers and addressees. An individual norm can never be followed on its own 
but only such a norm as part of a whole, the idea of normativity as a plurale tantum has as 
consequence the idea that an individual should abandon preferences born out of facticity in 
favor of normativity (or meaning) constituted by the collective. Phrased in Kantian terms, 
this means that an individual should only pursue such courses of action that, when 
generalized, are in conformity with the system of norms, or normativity, generally. The 
normative plurale tantum shares with the categorical imperative the same admonition – 
favor the meaning of the collective over the facticity of the brute, favor order over disorder. 
The possibility of creating such meaning and order is a simple requirement of human 
rationality. The imperative of creating such a system of order and meaning must be the 
requirement of legal positivism as the science of law. 
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